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residual bearing and the assignment of managerial control between two firms involved in the 
exchange of business know-how. Data were collected from contractual agreements between 
multinational enterprises and indigenous firms that formed collaborative ventures in developing 
countries. A simultaneous-equation model was employed to test hypotheses that were derived 
under a theoretical framework based on the new institutional economics. The empirical results 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 A number of authors have suggested that exchange relationships can be analyzed along an 
institutional continuum ranging from arm’s length deals on the market to internal transactions 
within the same firm (Gatignon and Andeson 1988, Joskow 1985, Pisano 1989, Williamson 
1985). The exchange arrangements that fall between the two extremes of this continuum, such as 
licensing agreements, management contracts and joint ventures, are often referred to as hybrid or 
intermediate institutions. Although such intermediate institutions tend to be very complex and 
can have infinite variations, the literature of the new institutional economics has highlighted two 
structural dimensions along which their economic attributes are defined. One dimension concerns 
how the exchange parties receive their respective payoffs from the exchange—a question that has 
received most attention from models of contracting under imperfect performance measurement. 
The other dimension concerns how the exchange parties partition the control rights to their joint 
or interdependent operations—a question that has received most attention from models of 
contracting under asset specificity. 
 Despite the theoretical distinction between these two structural dimensions, they are 
rarely distinguished in the existent empirical work on the choice of institutional arrangements in 
interfirm exchanges. Most commonly, the structure of such arrangements is operationalized as a 
single variable that is a priori correlated with both of the structural dimensions. The most often 
used variable is the equity ownership status of the exchange parties, which is generally specified 
in a complex contract with clauses affecting both the compensation and control dimensions of the 
exchange.1 Although this approach can help get around certain informational and statistical 
difficulties (to be discussed in more detail later), it subjects the interpretation of the empirical 
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findings to an additional measure of ambiguity. For instance, even if a statistical relationship is 
found between a party’s equity ownership status and some characteristic of the exchange, it is 
still not clear whether what matters is the method of payment or the means of control. 
 In this study, we attempt to conduct a two-dimensional analysis of interfirm arrangements 
for the exchange of business know-how, such as production and marketing expertise. The data 
used in our analysis were collected from collaborative ventures between multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and local firms in developing countries. Section II presents the theoretical framework 
under which this study is conducted. Section III derives a number of hypotheses that relate the 
two structural dimensions to some observable features of such collaborative ventures. Section IV 
explains the empirical methods employed in this study. Section V presents and discusses the 
empirical results. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. THE STRUCTURING OF EXCHANGES UNDER IMPERFECT CONTRACTING 
 In this paper, we use the expression “business know-how” to refer to any knowledge that 
is valuable to a firm’s operations, including not only such primary activities as production and 
marketing but also such supportive activities as labor and government relations. The literature on 
imperfect competition and growth of the firm has identified a number of attributes that tend to 
characterize the business know-how that a firm possesses. First, in order for any know-how to be 
valuable, it must contain a significant amount of proprietary knowledge (Lippman and Rumelt 
1982). Second, the knowledge is often spread across multiple employees of the firm, each of 
whom only possesses a part of the total (Nelson and Winter 1982). Third, the knowledge often 
consists of many tacit elements that are difficult to articulate and thus require extensive hands-on 
1See, for example, the empirical studies of Davidson and McFetridge (1985), Gatignon and Andeson (1988), Gomes-
Casseres (1989), Hennart (1991), Pisano (1989) and Shan (1990). 
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training in order to be fully transferred from one firm to another (Penrose 1959, Teece 1982). 
Hence, in order to consummate an interfirm exchange of business know-how that possesses these 
attributes, there must be an extended period of close interactions among many employees of the 
two firms. The exchange relationship between the firms, therefore, is likely to be complex and 
subject to a variety of contracting problems. 
 Contracting problems can arise both ex ante and ex post. Because ex ante difficulties in 
contracting tend to reduce the completeness of any contract reached, they often form part of the 
reasons for ex post difficulties in managing the resultant contractual relationship.2
2In an interfirm exchange involving the transfer of proprietary technology, for instance, the transferee by definition 
does not know exactly how the transfer process should proceed, and the contract between the two parties are hence 
necessarily incomplete. Although the transferee can try to stipulate in the contract that the transferor take some 
specified actions (such as send a certain number of engineers to the venture and give the transferee’s personnel a 
certain period of training), a complete transfer of the technology is likely to entail many detailed steps that the 
transferee does not know of. In order to cover these ex ante nonspecifiable actions expected from the transferor, the 
two parties may have to employ such vaguely worded contractual clauses as “reveal all relevant information about 
 Incomplete 
contracting can result from two types of information deficiencies ex ante. One is the uncertainty 
of future contingencies on which the actions of the contracting parties must depend, because such 
uncertainty can make it economically infeasible to specify many of the actions to be taken in the 
duration of the contract (Williamson 1975). In the case of exchanges in technological know-how, 
for example, it is often very difficult to anticipate the nature and extent of possible future 
improvements on the present know-how, let alone contracting on their potential applications ex 
ante. The other type of information deficiency that often gives rise to incomplete contracting 
(especially in the exchange of business know-how) is the possession of asymmetric information 
by the parties involved in the exchange (McManus 1975). When the know-how being traded is 
proprietary and contains many tacit elements, the buyer of the know-how or the service thereof 
will know much less than the seller about what the seller should do to fulfill its part of the 
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bargain. Even though the seller may possess the appropriate information, it is unlikely to have 
any incentive to put the information in the contract since the buyer has no means to verify its 
sufficiency or correctness.  
 Incomplete contracting leaves potential opportunities for the exchange parties to gain at 
the expense of the other in the contract implementation process. One can analytically distinguish 
between two kinds of ex post opportunism, moral hazard and holdup, which tend to be amenable 
to two different types of structural remedies (Alchian and Woodward 1988). 
A. Moral Hazard and Apportionment of Residual Claimancy 
 Moral hazard refers to the opportunism of shirking in situations where the actions of a 
contracting party can not be perfectly observed or verified. Interfirm exchanges of business 
know-how are often characterized by conditions that subject both parties to this kind of 
opportunistic behavior (Hennart 1988). First, both parties may face significant difficulty in 
monitoring the actions of the other due to their lack of knowledge about each other’s expertise. 
Second, since the outcome of the exchange is generally under the influence of both parties as 
well as random factors beyond their control, the extent to which the outcome is attributable to a 
given party can also be easily subject to dispute. In the face of such double moral hazard, 
performance incentives for the two parties may have to be provided primarily through a 
compensation structure under which they each bear some of the residuals from their exchange 
(Barzel 1989).3
the technology” and “do everything necessary to achieve the best possible operating results.” Because such vague 
performance measures are inevitably difficult to verify ex post, their enforcement is likely to be problematic. 
 In a joint production or service operation run by two otherwise independent 
3Contractual constraints may be more effective than residual claims in enforcing those aspects of knowledge transfer 
(such as delivery of documents specifying the type of machinery to be procured) that can be unambiguously spelled 
out in a contract to allow a court or an arbitrator to easily identify them as the MNE’s obligations (Chi 1996). In this 
sense, contractual constraints and residual claims are complementary in dealing with the moral hazard problem in the 
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firms, the residuals from their exchange are generally reflected in the operation’s accounting 
profit or equity stock. 
 Note that, in a bilateral exchange relationship, an increase in one party’s residual bearing 
necessarily means a decrease in the other party’s residual bearing (Holmstrom 1982). Since the 
extent of each party’s residual bearing affects its incentive to perform in exchanges under double 
moral hazard, the apportionment of residual claimancy between the two parties influences the 
overall incentive structure of the contract. Theoretical models of such exchange relations suggest 
that the incentive-optimizing apportionment of residual claimancy depends on how measurable 
each party’s performance is and how severely each party’s shirking is likely to dissipate the gains 
from the exchange. Specifically, the optimal residual share is shown to be such that a greater 
extent of residual bearing be given to a party when that party’s performance is ceteris paribus 
less measurable or more important to the realization of the potential gains from the exchange 
(Chi 1996, Eswaran and Kotwal 1985). 
 The efficacy of residual claimancy in mitigating opportunism, however, is limited to the 
strength of the linkage between the opportunistic behavior in question and the residuals from the 
exchange. In interfirm exchanges of business know-how, certain opportunistic acts can cause a 
large wealth transfer between the two parties without having a comparable impact on the residual 
earnings from their joint operation. In the licensing of technology, for instance, the licenser can 
become vulnerable to the acts of ex post wealth expropriation by the licensee (Teece 1986). 
Typically, the licenser would restrict the geographical areas in which the licensee is allowed to 
sell its output produced under the license. But once the licensee acquires the technology, it may 
ignore any contractual restrictions in this regard and sell its output beyond the area designated in 
exchange of business know-how (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990). The focus of our paper, meanwhile, is on those 
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the licensing agreement. Even without such blatant violation of the contract, the licensee may 
still be able to expropriate additional wealth from the licenser by forcing favorable changes in the 
terms of the original contract via threats of noncooperation once it no longer relies on the licenser 
for the technological input. These acts of opportunism often can be more accurately characterized 
as holdup, and the hazards of their occurring generally can not be checked cost-effectively by the 
apportionment of the residuals from the joint operation of the two parties.  
B. Holdup and Assignment of Residual Control 
 Holdup refers to the opportunism of expropriating wealth from one’s exchange partner in 
transactions that are characterized by a significant degree of asset specificity. It involves either a 
violation of some clearly specified agreements or a refusal to cooperate on issues that are left 
open or turn out to be unrealistically specified in existing contracts. Such expropriating activities 
cannot be fully anticipated during contract negotiation because their cost/benefit calculus is often 
uncertain ex ante and subject to change after the contract is negotiated (Klein 1992). In interfirm 
exchanges of business know-how, for instance, the discovery of an unexpected and significant 
new application of the know-how can spawn serious disputes between the exchange partners 
regarding their respective rights to profit from the new application. Furthermore, although the 
aim of holdup concerns the distribution of rents between the exchange partners, the activities 
undertaken for this end (such as bargaining and litigation) can consume significant amounts of 
economic resources (Crocker and Masten 1991, Goldberg and Erickson 1987).4
aspects of knowledge transfer that can not be completely and unambiguously spelled out in contractual clauses. 
 As neither the 
rents redistributed nor the resources dissipated via holdup activities are normally well reflected in 
4Masten (1988) pointed out that, if holdup activities only redistribute wealth and are by themselves costless, holdup 
hazards would be no different than any normal business risks and under a risk-neutrality their effect on contract 
design would be indeterminate. 
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the residuals of the exchange, the apportionment of residual claimancy between the two parties in 
general can not provide a good remedy for this kind of ex post opportunism.  
 As articulated by Williamson (1975, 1985), the economically efficient remedy for holdup 
tends to be found in the control structure of the exchange arrangement, because it is the control 
of certain critical decisions that gives a party the ability to gain at the expense of its exchange 
partner. Grossman and Hart (1986) suggest that the rights of control over decisions in a bilateral 
exchange fall into two types, depending on whether a given decision is contractually designated 
ex ante as the purview of a particular party. Those decision rights that are not assigned ex ante to 
either party fall by default to the party that is designated in the contract as the owner of the 
exchange operation. In many interfirm arrangements, however, ownership to the exchange 
operation is shared between the two parties, and each of the parties holds some of the decision-
making positions via their own personnel assigned to manage the joint operation. Although some 
important decisions do require consensus of the two parties in such an arrangement, many of the 
ex ante unspecified decisions are de facto made by whichever party holds the relevant managerial 
positions through its own personnel (Contractor 1985). Hence, the extent of control that a party 
holds over the decisions of the joint operation is largely determined by the extent to which that 
party controls the decision-making positions of the operation through staffing arrangements.  
 Grossman and Hart (1986) argued that the party holding the ownership or residual rights 
of control in a bilateral exchange can be expected to reap a greater gain from the exchange. We 
submit that greater residual control through staffing arrangements in a jointly owned exchange 
operation has a similar effect because such control represents not only opportunities to gain at the 
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expense of the other party but also means to curb potential opportunism by the other party.5
 Since the two contracting parties in general both have the potential to engage in ex post 
opportunism, the assignment of residual control in an interfirm exchange needs to balance the 
holdup hazards posed by both parties. As pointed out by Masten (1988) and Klein (1992), an 
adjustment in contract terms intended to reduce the holdup potential of one exchange party often 
would increase the holdup potential of the other party. This trade-off in our view is particularly 
important to the assignment of residual control in an interfirm exchange of business know-how 
because greater control gives a party more opportunities to gain at the expense of the other and 
leaves less opportunities for the other to do so. Since a given holdup hazard can often be lowered 
by removing or reducing the potential offender’s control over certain decisions, we can expect 
that a party will be given less residual control when that party poses a particular holdup hazard.
 As 
shown by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990), efficient contracting will require the removal of 
certain decision making discretion from an agent when it is too expensive to provide the right 
incentives (such as via residual claimancy) for the agent to refrain from costly opportunism. 
6
5Grossman and Hart (1986) used the phrase “residual rights of control” to refer to decision-making prerogatives that 
are not contractually designated and thus are left to the owner of the exchange operation when the operation has only 
one owner. In this paper, we use the phrase “residual control” to refer to decision-making prerogatives that are not 
contractually restricted to either party but are effectively controlled by the party that holds the relevant managerial 
positions in the exchange operation when the operation is jointly owned by both of the parties involved.  
  
6Masten (1988) suggested that the problem of optimal contracting in the face of holdup hazards can be formulated as 
one of minimizing the expected value dissipation resulting from the two parties’ holdup activities. Klein (1992), in 
the meantime, formulated the problem as one of minimizing the sum of the two parties’ expected gains from their 
respective holdup activities by noting that this formation will imply the minimization of transaction costs if the value 
dissipated from holdup is proportional to the value appropriable through holdup. We suggest that the proportionality 
assumption is not necessary for Klein’s formulation to imply the minimization of transaction costs if the costs of 
negotiating the initial contract (including lost profit due to failure to reach a mutually beneficial agreement) are also 
taken into account. As suggested by Balakrishnan and Koza (1993), the negotiation of an interfirm arrangement is 
often plagued by the adverse selection problem due to information asymmetry between the two parties. Significant 
information asymmetry can exist regarding each party’s valuation of their own reputation (or their “trustworthiness”) 
and the circumstances that will likely cause them to engage in ex post opportunism. If the two parties can negotiate, 
at a relative low cost, contract terms that effectively reduce the threats of ex post opportunism, they may be able to 
significantly cut down the ex ante bargaining costs (including the value lost in the case of their failure to reach an 
Chi, Tailan. (1997) The Structuring of Interfirm Exchanges in Business Know-How: Evidence From International Collaborative Ventures. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 18, 279-294.   
Publisher's Official Version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199706)18:4<279::AID-MDE826>3.0.CO;2-S>. 
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/
 We can summarize the analysis of this section in two propositions regarding the structure 
of interfirm exchanges in business know-how. First, a party is likely to hold greater residual 
claimancy in the exchange operation ceteris paribus when its performance is less measurable or 
more important to the realization of the potential gains from the exchange. Second, a party is 
likely to hold greater residual control in the exchange operation ceteris paribus when it is more 
vulnerable to holdup hazards posed by the other party. Based on these two propositions, we will 
in the next section derive a number of testable hypotheses about the structure of collaborative 
ventures between a multinational enterprise and an indigenous firm in developing countries. 
III. HYPOTHESES 
 The objective of this section is to scrutinize the relations of certain observable variables 
with the apportionment of residual claimancy and the assignment of residual control between two 
participants in an international collaborative venture (ICV). Our examination will focus on ICVs 
that involve the transfer of some technological know-how from a multinational enterprise (MNE) 
to a local firm of the host country. The literature on ICVs suggests two reasons for such interfirm 
arrangements (Beamish 1988, Contractor and Lorange 1987). The most important reason is the 
presence of complementarity between the resources of the two firms. Although the MNE’s 
technological know-how often constitutes the principal rent-earning resource of the venture, the 
local firm may also possess some country-specific marketing or management skills that the MNE 
lacks and can not replicate in a cost-effective fashion. Without such resource complementarity, 
the MNE in general would not see any reason to share its know-how with a local firm unless the 
local government requires this as a condition for doing business in the host country. 
agreement). Under such conditions, the minimization of transaction costs may still require the installation of contract 
clauses that help reduce the holdup potential of the contracting parties even if ex post bargaining is costless. 
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 An effective transfer of the know-how in question from the MNE to the local firm would 
normally entail the provision of some training for the local firm’s personnel, except in cases 
where the know-how is simple enough to be fully coded in a highly intelligible technical manual. 
Although the two parties can negotiate certain contractual stipulations on technical training (such 
as time, place and duration), the detailed design and implementation of a training program has to 
be left to the MNE’s discretion due to the local firm’s lack of knowledge (Teece 1982). Hence, 
such discretionary training is likely to be one of the MNE’s resource contributions that needs to 
be motivated through considerable residual claimancy (Chi 1996). As explained by Contractor 
(1985), the basic economic rationale for an MNE to train locals is to reduce the use of the more 
expensive expatriates. So, in contrast to its effect on residual claimancy, more training from the 
MNE is likely to result in more managerial and technical positions being held the local firm’s 
personnel.7
H1. The MNE is likely to bear more residual claimancy but hold less residual 
control in the venture ceteris paribus when it is expected to provide more 
discretionary training for the local firm’s personnel. 
 We, therefore, have the following hypothesis regarding how the MNE’s provision of 
discretionary training affects the partition of claimancy and control in an ICV. 
 The extent of knowledge transfer from the MNE to the local firm depends on not only the 
MNE’s effort in teaching but also the local firm’s capacity of learning. When the local firm has 
more accurate information about the MNE’s technological know-how, it will be able to negotiate 
more effective constraints on the MNE’s discretion in training and obtain more knowledge from 
the MNE by asking relevant questions in the training process (Kogut 1988). Hence, for the same 
7As Williamson (1985: 90-95) pointed out, the optimal institutional choice should be one that minimizes the sum of 
production and governance costs. 
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discretionary effort from the MNE, one can expect more of its know-how to be transferred as the 
local firm is more capable of exacting information from the MNE. One condition that tends to 
make the local firm better able to “learn” is prior experience in a business that is technologically 
similar to that of the MNE’s unit involved in the venture (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 1989). Such 
similarity can be expected to lessen the need for the use of residual claimancy as inducement for 
the MNE to assert more effort in training. In the meantime, the local firm’s capacity to absorb the 
MNE’s know-how could also raise the MNE’s concern over losing its bargaining leverage and 
thus becoming vulnerable to holdup by the local firm (Beamish and Banks 1987). Such concern 
could then prompt the MNE to bargain for greater residual control during the initial negotiation 
of the venture’s governance structure. By controlling certain functions of the venture through its 
own personnel, the MNE may be able to withhold a key subset of its know-how and retain more 
effective control over the use of its rent-earning assets (Geringer and Herbert 1989). We can, 
therefore, derive the following hypothesis from the above analysis. 
H2. The MNE is likely to bear less residual claimancy but hold more residual 
control in the venture ceteris paribus when the local firm’s business is more 
similar to the business of the MNE’s unit involved in the venture. 
 A necessary condition for the local firm to be able to misappropriate the rents from the 
MNE’s technological know-how is the existence of imperfections in the prevailing legal regime 
governing industrial property rights (namely, patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets). 
The more imperfect the legal regime is, the higher is the risk for such misappropriation to occur 
and the greater is the benefit that the MNE can derive from retaining control over the decisions 
on the venture’s operation (Teece 1986). However, it is often costly for the MNE to expand its 
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control over an ICV by using more of its own personnel to manage the venture due to large 
compensation differentials between expatriates and locals in developing countries. Since the 
extent of protection afforded to industrial property rights varies from country to country in the 
developing world (Benko 1987), the trade-off that the MNE faces in appraising the control 
structures of its ICVs is also likely to vary from one country to another. Hence, 
H3. The MNE is likely to hold a higher degree of residual control in the venture 
ceteris paribus when the protection that the host country’s legal regime affords to 
industrial property rights is perceived to be weaker. 
 As alluded to earlier, the local firm is also likely to possess some expertise that the MNE 
lacks in marketing the venture’s output or managing labor and government relations in the host 
country. Because such input contributions from the local firm are often difficult for the MNE to 
monitor, they may need to be motivated through considerable residual claimancy (Hennart 1988). 
The country-specific marketing skills of the local firm will not be so important to the venture’s 
economic performance, however, if much of the venture’s output is sold through the MNE’s own 
corporate network, either locally or abroad, without the local firm’s involvement. Hence, we can 
expect that the benefit from apportioning residuals to the local firm will diminish as more of the 
venture’s output is marketed through the MNE’s own network. In the meantime, as more of the 
venture’s output enters the MNE’s corporate system (either sold to its own customers or used as 
inputs in its own production facilities), a greater economic loss will arise from a breakdown in 
coordination between the venture and the MNE’s other operations (Davidson and McFetridge 
1985). This concern, in turn, is likely to motivate the MNE to bargain for its own personnel to 
control more of the venture’s functions. Therefore, 
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H4. The MNE is likely to bear more residual claimancy and hold more residual 
control in the venture ceteris paribus when more of the venture’s output is 
marketed through the MNE’s own corporate network. 
 Finally, there are also theoretical grounds to expect the presence of a positive relationship 
between a party’s share of residual claimancy and its holding of residual control. First, a higher 
degree of residual control by a party means that it will perform more of the venture’s managerial 
functions, making the profitability of the venture more dependent on its effort (Grossman and 
Hart 1986). Then, there is likely a greater benefit from giving the party a stronger performance 
incentive by apportioning it a higher share of residual claimancy in the venture. Second, when 
one of the parties can easily measure and monitor the performance of the other, that party should 
also be able to gain control over the other’s complementary assets at low costs (Barzel 1989). 
This condition in turn is likely to result in one of them holding more of both residual control and 
residual claimancy in the venture. 
H5. There exists a positive relationship ceteris paribus between the MNE’s 
bearing of residual claimancy and its holding of residual control in the venture. 
IV. EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES 
 This section explains the data and the econometric methods used in our study. Empirical 
investigation of our research questions requires detailed information about the nature of the 
business arrangements between the parties involved in the exchange. We were fortunate to be 
given access to a set of contracts and related documents on international collaborative ventures 
(ICVs) at the United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations. Although we had access to 
over two hundred of such contracts, only 93 of them were found usable because many of the 
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contracts did not contain enough information for this study. Each of the 93 ICVs in our sample 
had exactly two participants: one MNE from an industrialized country and one privately-owned 
local firm from the host developing country. In every case the MNE was expected to transfer 
some business know-how to the local firm as per the contractual agreements between the two 
parties. The years of venture formation ranged from 1965 to 1980, and every effort was made to 
ensure that the information on each of the ICVs was current in the year when it was first set up. 
As will be explained below, the data extracted from the contracts and related documents (such as 
memoranda of understanding) were supplemented by information from other archival sources. 
A. Variables 
 The exact definitions of the variables used in our empirical model are presented in the 
Appendix. Here, we just give a brief explanation for each of the variables. 
 The variable SHARE measures the MNE’s share of residual claimancy in the venture. If 
the venture involved equity ownership, the variable was taken as the MNE’s share of equity, 
adjusted for the effect of any fee that is paid to a party on the basis of the venture’s accounting 
profit (such as a management fee).8 If the venture did not involve equity ownership (such as in a 
contractual joint venture), the variable was taken as the MNE’s share of the venture’s accounting 
profit as specified in the contract between the two parties. The value of the variable was set to 
zero (one) if the MNE (local firm) did not own any equity share in the venture and was not paid 
any fee on the basis of the venture’s accounting profit.9
8When screening the contracts for our sample, we encountered two contracts that used nonlinear sharing rules by 
which the MNE’s compensation is specified as a step function of the venture’s accounting profit. As the effect of 
such a sharing rule is likely to be different from a linear sharing rule (Holmstrom 1982), we did not include the two 
cases in the sample. 
  
9It should be noted that this definition of residual share does not take into account any side payments (e.g., royalties 
paid to or mandated purchases from either party) even though such payments may vary with some components of the 
venture’s account profit (e.g., sales). Their exclusion from our calculation of the residual share is mainly due to the 
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 The variable CONTROL measures the degree of control that the MNE held over decision 
making in the venture. The basic rationale for our specification of this variable is that holding 
key managerial positions in the venture conveys a more effective means of control than holding 
only some contractual rights of control and that occupying more of the key positions provides a 
party with greater control.10
 The variable TRAINING measures the extent of discretionary training that the MNE was 
expected to provide for the local firm’s personnel. The definition of this variable emphasizes 
training whose outcome depended on the effort of the MNE but was difficult for the local firm to 
influence. We expect that training conducted at the venture’s own facility in the host country 
would be more dependent on the effort of the MNE and less subject to the influence of the local 
firm than training conducted at another established production facility of the MNE’s elsewhere. 
In addition, we also expect that, when the training is conducted at a dedicated training facility, 
the training program normally would be routinized so that the MNE’s effort is unlikely to make a 
very significant difference. Based on H1, this variable was expected to have a positive partial 
effect on SHARE and a negative partial effect on CONTROL. 
 By hypothesis five (H5), SHARE and CONTROL were expected to 
have a positive partial effect on each other after controlling the effects of the other variables. 
 The variable SIMILARITY is intended to reflect the similarity of the local firm’s original 
business to that of the MNE’s unit involved in the ICV. The definition of this variable is based 
on the premise that groupings in the SIC codes provide at least some useful information about the 
lack of information that can be used as the basis for converting them to a measure consistent with the share of equity 
or accounting profit. If we assume that the two parties choose an output level such that the profit of the venture is 
maximized, then it is theoretically possible to derive a conversion formula based on the knowledge of the venture’s 
cost and revenue functions. Since this knowledge was not available for any of the 93 ventures, we had no way to 
make a theoretically justifiable conversion and thus decided not to incorporate side payments in the calculation of the 
residual share. Although this treatment can potentially lead to some biases in the measure of the residual share, we 
feel that other possible treatments are likely to result in even greater biases.  
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similarity between two businesses. By H2, the variable was expected to have a negative partial 
effect on SHARE and have a positive partial effect on CONTROL.  
 The variable PROTECTION is intended to reflect the extent of imperfection in the host 
country’s legal system in terms of its protection for industrial property rights at the time of the 
venture’s formation. The coding of this variable was based on the evaluations given by Business 
International Corporation (1965-1980). The variable was expected to have a positive partial 
effect on CONTROL by H3 and was not expected to have any direct effect on SHARE. 
 The variable MARKETING measures the approximate proportion of the venture’s output 
sold through the MNE’s own network. We used a four-level ordinal scale to code this variable 
because many of the contracts only gave very rough specifications in this regard. Based on H4, 
the variable was expected to have a positive partial effect on both SHARE and CONTROL. 
 Because some of the host countries had policies of restricting foreign equity participation 
or use of expatriate personnel at the time of venture formation, we also introduced two variables 
to control for the effects of such government intervention. The variable EQUITYRES is intended 
to measure the restrictiveness of the host country’s policy toward foreign equity ownership. This 
variable was expected to have a negative partial effect on the MNE’s share of residual claimancy 
since equity sharing was used by many of the ventures to apportion the residuals between the two 
parties. Although the variable could also affect the MNE’s relative control through its effect on 
the MNE’s equity share, we do not expect it to have a direct effect on the MNE’s residual control 
in the presence of the second control variable in our empirical model. 
 The second control variable is PERSONNELRES, intended to capture the effect of 
restrictions that the host government placed on the use of expatriate personnel in ICVs. Unlike 
10As will be discussed later in this section, it is possible to test whether the ordering of this variable’s seven 
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restrictions on foreign equity ownership, restrictions on foreign managerial control are often not 
fully reflected in the initial control structure because of difficulty to find qualified natives of the 
host country to fill certain key positions in the beginning of the venture. The host government 
often instead requires the ICV to set up a schedule for replacing the MNE’s expatriate personnel 
with the local firm’s personnel in a graduated manner (United Nations Center on Transnational 
Corporations 1978). As the anticipation of future changes in the venture’s control structure might 
also weaken the rationale for giving the MNE a high degree of risk bearing, this variable was 
expected to have a negative partial effect on both the MNE’s residual claimancy and its residual 
control.  
B. Specification and Estimation of the Empirical Model 
 As the objective of this study is to explain interfirm arrangements along two distinct but 
mutually correlated structural dimensions, we decided to use a simultaneous-equation regression 
model for our empirical analysis. The specification of the two regression equations, based on the 
theoretical relationships explained earlier, is presented in Table 1. Note that PROTECTION is 
excluded from the first equation and EQUITYRES is excluded from the second equation on the 
basis of the hypotheses derived in the last section and the explanations provided in the earlier 
part of this section. Given that one exogenous variable is excluded from each equation, the two 
equations are exactly identified.  
 As specified in Table 1, SHARE and CONTROL are the two endogenous variables of the 
simultaneous-equation model. Because of the way in which these two variables are measured, we 
might get a biased estimation if the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) procedure were used to estimate 
the model. First, as explained earlier, the value of SHARE is bounded between zero and one. If 
categories (see the Appendix for their definitions) fits the data we collected for the study. 
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the observations contain a large number of zeros or ones, its distribution will have a spike at the 
lower or upper bound. In such cases, the OLS procedure is known to produce biased estimates, 
and unbiased estimation requires the use of a tobit procedure (Maddala 1983). In our model, the 
equation that has SHARE on its left hand side should ideally be estimated under a two-limit tobit 
model because the variable is theoretically censored on both ends. But as suggested by Nelson 
and Olson (1978), if one of the extreme values has only a small number of observations, a one-
limit tobit model should still produce basically unbiased estimates. In our sample, SHARE has 
the value of zero in 41% of the cases and has the value of one in only 3% of the cases. Since the 
extent of censoring from above is negligible, we estimated the equation under a one-limit tobit 
procedure due to estimation difficulties arising from the simultaneity between the two equations.  
 The left-hand-side variable of the second regression equation (i.e., CONTROL) is strictly 
speaking an ordered categorical variable. Since the interval between the categories of this ordinal 
measure may not correctly reflect that of the underlying continuous variable, the OLS procedure 
may yield biased estimates, and the ordered probit procedure has been suggested to correct for 
potential estimation biases (Maddala 1983). In the meantime, the concern over such biases in our 
case is to some extent mitigated by the fact our measure of CONTROL contains a relatively large 
number of categories (7) and is defined symmetrically around the center—the category of equal 
control (see the Appendix). Because of difficulties in estimating a simultaneous-equation model 
that incorporates both the tobit and ordered probit procedures, we decided to rely on the OLS 
procedure to estimate the second regression equation. We did, nevertheless, perform an ordered 
probit estimation of this equation without assuming the simultaneity to test whether a different 
ordering of the variable’s categories would have a better fit to the data. 
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 In summary, the econometric model we adopted for this study has both a tobit model and 
an OLS model embedded in a simultaneous-equation model. This model was initially proposed 
by Nelson and Olson (1978) and was further developed by Amemiya (1979). The computer codes 
that we employed to estimate the model were suggested by Greene (1992: 686-687) based on a 
two-stage method.11
V. RESULTS 
 The regression results are reported in the next section. 
 Table 2 presents the results of our regression analysis. The two middle columns of the 
table report the regression coefficients estimated under the simultaneous-equation model. The 
rightmost column of the table reports the regression coefficients estimated under a binomial logit 
model, whose dependent variable was set to zero if the MNE had no ownership interest in the 
venture and set to one otherwise. The logit regression results are provided here for comparison 
purposes because many studies adopted a dichotomous measure of venture structures and used 
the logit procedure in their regression analyses. It is, however, the simultaneous-equation model 
that represents the appropriate statistical method for testing the hypotheses of this study. The 
likelihood ratio test shows that each of the regression equations is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 As can be seen in Table 2, the extent of discretionary TRAINING that the MNE was 
expected to provide for the local firm’s personnel has a significant impact on both SHARE and 
CONTROL. The sign of its coefficient in equation 1 indicates that the venture partners tended to 
give the MNE greater residual claimancy to alleviate the potential moral hazard problem in the 
provision of such training. The negative sign of its coefficient in equation 2 suggests that training 
might be used as a measure to substitute locals for the more costly expatriates in such ventures. 
11The codes given in Greene (1992: 686-687) contain several errors that would result in an incorrect estimation of 
the covariance matrix. Information regarding how to correct the errors can be obtained from the first author of this 
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The fact that the coefficients of this variable have opposite signs in the two regression equations 
shows that there is a degree of independence between the apportionment of residual claimancy 
and the assignment of residual control in an interfirm arrangement. 
 The SIMILARITY of the local firm’s business to that of the MNE’s unit involved in the 
venture also has a significant effect on both SHARE and CONTROL. As expected, the variable’s 
coefficient in equation 1 has a negative sign, suggesting that the local firm’s prior experience in a 
technologically similar business might enable it to acquire more of the MNE’s know-how via 
“active learning”, thus reducing the importance of the MNE’s effort in training. The positive sign 
of the variable’s coefficient in equation 2 confirms our hypothesis that the MNE was likely to 
hold more residual control over the venture’s operation when the local firm appeared better able 
to absorb the MNE’s know-how and gain its technological independence. The opposing effects 
of this variable on SHARE and CONTROL again suggest that the two dimensions of the venture 
structure might be adjusted in a differentiated manner to remedy different types of transaction 
cost problems. 
 The negative sign of the variable PROTECTION in equation 2 indicates that the MNE 
tended to seek greater residual control in the venture when the protection that the host country’s 
legal regime afforded to industrial property rights appeared to be weaker. As explained earlier, by 
gaining greater residual control in the venture, the MNE might be able to withhold a key subset 
of its know-how and retain more effective control over the use of its rent-earning assets.  
 Although the coefficients of MARKETING have the predicted signs in both regression 
equations, only one of the coefficients is statistically significant. As the variable measures the 
portion of the venture’s output sold via the MNE’s own network, its positive sign in equation 1 
article upon request. 
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confirms our hypothesis that the benefit from the local firm’s residual bearing would be lower 
when its marketing effort appeared less important to the venture.  
 We have earlier hypothesized that the residual claimancy and residual control of a party 
would exert a positive effect on each other after the effects of other variables are controlled for. It 
is surprising that the effect of CONTROL on SHARE is not statistically significant, despite the 
highly significant positive effect of SHARE on CONTROL. This result may reflect the policy of 
“unbundling” that was popular in the developing world until the late 1980s (Hennart 1989). The 
policy was based on the supposition that developing countries would be more successful in 
gaining economic independence by restricting foreign equity ownership in technology transfer 
arrangements. Because it was often difficult to find professionally qualified natives to fill key 
technical and managerial positions in the venture, MNE was often given substantial managerial 
control over the venture’s operation without being a major equity holder. A review of the ICV 
contracts used in our sample reveals that some of the ventures did have this type of arrangements. 
 Another surprise in the regression results relates to the effect of the host country’s policy 
toward the use of expatriate personnel (PERSONNELRES) in ICVs. Despite expectation to the 
contrary, this variable has a significant positive coefficient in equation 1. It suggests that the 
MNE were likely given a greater share of residual claimancy when the host government had a 
policy of restricting the use of expatriate personnel, with other things held equal. This finding 
may reflect the way in which such a policy is often implemented. Faced with a shortage of 
qualified natives in the country, the host government often had to accept substantial foreign 
managerial control in the beginning of the venture and required a gradual shift of managerial 
control and equity ownership to the local firm. The knowledge of such scheduled changes in the 
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venture might make the host government more willing to accept a higher initial equity share for 
the MNE than otherwise (De la Torre 1981).  
 As noted earlier, existent studies have generally used a binomial logit model (BLM) to 
investigate the problem of institutional choice in interfirm exchanges of business know-how, and 
a simultaneous-equation model (SEM) would allow a richer and less ambiguous analysis of this 
research question. We can illustrate the informational advantages of the SEM by performing a 
similar analysis of our data under the more traditional BLM (see Table 2). First, the BLM only 
permits inferences about a variable’s effect on the likelihood for the MNE to have equity 
participation in the venture; the SEM, however, allows direct inferences about a variable’s effect 
on the more elaborately defined venture structure. Furthermore, the regression coefficient of an 
exogenous variable in the SEM represents its effect on the dependent variable in the regression 
equation after controlling for the potential reciprocal effects of the two endogenous variables on 
each other. This reveals detailed information about the trade-offs involved in the negotiation of 
the ICV structure that is not possible to obtain under the BLM. Take the similarity of the local 
firm’s business to that of the MNE’s unit involved in the venture, for instance. Under the SEM, it 
is found to have a negative partial effect on the MNE’s residual share and a positive partial effect 
on the MNE’s residual control. Under the BLM, however, it is impossible to see the variable’s 
opposing effects on the two different dimensions of the ICV structure. Because the SEM more 
fully utilizes the available information on the venture structure, the statistical significance of the 
exogenous variables also tends to be higher in the SEM than in the BLM. It is interesting to note 
that every exogenous variable is significant the 0.05 level in at least one of the equations under 
the SEM while only two of them reach this level of statistical significance under the BLM.  
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 We also performed ordered probit and OLS estimations of the second equation without 
embedding it in a simultaneous-equation model. The results of these estimations, given in Table 
3, can serve two purposes. The first is to test whether our data provide any empirical support for 
the way in which we ranked the different categories of the variable CONTROL, and the other is 
to shed some light on the extent of difference between the ordered probit and OLS estimates.  
 As explained earlier, a basic assumption for our adopted ordering of the seven categories 
identified for the variable CONTROL is that holding key managerial positions in the venture 
conveys a more effective means of control than holding only some contractual rights of control. 
One may test this assumption by reversing the ranking of some of the categories and finding out 
whether the recoded variable is better explained statistically by the regression than the originally 
coded variable (via a comparison of their respective log likelihood functions).12
 A comparison of the ordered probit estimates with the OLS estimates reveals that the two 
alternative estimation procedures do not result in markedly different estimates under the single-
equation formulation. It is, however, interesting to see that the endogenous variables show a 
 We conducted 
such a test by reversing the order of categories 1 and 2 and the order of categories 4 and 5, since 
the ranking of these two pairs of adjacent categories seems to be subject to more uncertainty than 
any other pairs. As shown by the results of both the ordered probit and OLS regressions in Table 
3, the recoded variable is not as well explained by the regression as the originally coded variable 
based on the values of the log likelihood functions. The existence of such differences provides 
some support for the ordering specified in the Appendix, even though their magnitudes are quite 
small (which could be due to the roughness of our measurement).  
12We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this method of testing the ordering of the different categories in the 
variable CONTROL. 
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much lower level of statistical significance when the simultaneity between the two equations is 
removed (as can be seen from the OLS estimates for the second equation in Tables 2 and 3). 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 As Alchian and Woodward (1988) noted in their review article, economic studies on the 
efficiency of contracting progressed for a long time along two largely separate lines. One line of 
inquiry focused on the difficulty of performance measurement and pointed to the design of the 
compensation structure as a key contracting mechanism. The other line of inquiry, meanwhile, 
focused on the problem of asset specificity and pointed to the design of the control structure as a 
key contracting mechanism. Although more recent theoretical work has suggested that these two 
dimensions of the contractual structure represent two distinct but interdependent mechanisms, 
few studies have distinguished them empirically.13
 As discussed in the preceding section, the two-dimensional framework for analyzing the 
structure of interfirm exchanges received clear support from our regression analysis. In an earlier 
study, Gatignon and Anderson (1988) also hypothesized the control structure of joint ventures to 
be a function of transaction cost considerations, but their regression results did not provide clear 
support for this hypothesis.
 Our study is one of the first to perform an 
empirical analysis of interfirm exchange arrangements along these two structural dimensions. 
14
13See, for example, the theoretical models of Grossman and Hart (1986), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and 
Masten (1988). 
 Although they recognized the potential for significant deviations of 
a party’s managerial control from its equity ownership, due to the lack of access to more accurate 
information, they measured the MNE’s control in joint ventures as a multinomial variable based 
14In the meantime, their study found strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the MNE’s choice between 
partnering and going it alone is a function of transaction cost considerations. 
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on its share of equity. In addition, their regression analysis was performed under a multinomial 
logit model that did not presume the dependent variable to have a consistent rank-ordering. 
 Because it is normally difficult to obtain direct measures of transaction costs such as the 
potential loss from shirking or holdup, empirical studies (including this one) are generally forced 
to use proxies that tend to represent more than one type of transaction cost considerations. Since 
moral hazard and holdup tend to be addressed by adjustments in the two different dimensions of 
the contracting structure, a proxy variable could a priori affect both of the structural dimensions 
and might even influence them in opposite directions. Then, it might be rather easy to put forth 
contradicting arguments about the effect of a proxy variable when the contracting structure is 
measured by a single variable that is correlated with both types of the structural arrangements. 
The empirical methods developed in this study can help reduce such ambiguity and potentially 
benefit future studies on the contracting structure of bilateral exchanges. 
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APPENDIX 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable Definition Mean s.d. 
SHARE 
(source of data: a) 
= the MNE’s percentage share of the venture’s accounting profit 0.34 0.34 
CONTROL 
(source of data: a) 
 
= 0 if the local firm’s personnel held all the key managerial positions in the venture and was not 
constrained by contract to obtain the MNE’s consent on any major managerial decisions 
= 1 if the local firm’s personnel held all the key managerial positions in the venture but was 
constrained by contract to obtain the MNE’s consent on some important managerial decisions 
= 2 if the local firm’s personnel held a majority of the key managerial positions in the venture, 
with the MNE’s personnel holding a minority of such positions 
= 3 if the key managerial positions in the venture were divided roughly equally between the local 
firm and the MNE 
= 4 if the MNE’s personnel held a majority of the key managerial positions in the venture, with 
the local firm’s personnel holding a minority of such positions 
= 5 if the MNE’s personnel held all the key managerial positions in the venture but was constrain-
ed by contract to obtain the local firm’s consent on some important managerial decisions 
= 6 if the MNE’s personnel held all the key managerial positions in the venture and was not 
constrained by contract to obtain the local firm’s consent on any major managerial decisions 
1.66 1.10 
TRAINING 
(source of data: a) 
 
= 0 if the MNE was not required or expected to provide any training for the local firm’s personnel 
= 1 if the MNE was required or expected to provide some training for the local firm’s personnel at 
a dedicated training facility that it owned and operated 
= 2 if the MNE was required or expected to provide some training for the local firm’s personnel at 
a production facility that it owned and operated 
= 3 if the MNE was required or expected to devise and implement a training program for the local 
firm’s personnel in the host country 
1.73 1.19 
Source of data: a = the written contracts and memoranda of understanding between the collaborating parties; b = Business International 
Corp. (1965-1980); c = U.S. Department of Commerce (1965-1980). 
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APPENDIX continued 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable Definition Mean s.d. 
SIMILARITY 
(source of data: a) 
 
= 0 if the SIC code of the local firm’s business and the SIC code of the MNE’s unit involved in 
the venture belong to different product/service groups 
= 1 if the 3-digit SIC code of the local firm’s business and the 3-digit SIC code of the MNE’s unit 
involved in the venture are different but their first 2 digits are the same 
= 2 if the 4-digit SIC code of the local firm’s business and the 4-digit SIC code of the MNE’s unit 
involved in the CV are different but their first 3 digits are the same 
= 3 if the 4-digit SIC code of the local firm’s business and the 4-digit SIC code of the MNE’s unit 
involved in the CV are the same 
1.56 1.04 
PROTECTION 
(source of data: b) 
 
= 0 if the host country’s legal system was rated by Business International Corp. as above average 
among developing countries with regard to its protection of foreign-owned industrial property 
= 1 if the host country’s legal system was rated by Business International Corp. as about average 
among developing countries with regard to its protection of foreign-owned industrial property 
= 2 if the host country’s legal system was rated by Business International Corp. as below average 
among developing countries with regard to its protection of foreign-owned industrial property 
0.47 0.73 
MARKETING 
(source of data: a) 
 
= 0 if the MNE was not expected to market any of the venture’s output via its own network 
= 1 if the MNE was expected to market about 1/4 of the venture’s output via its own network 
= 2 if the MNE was expected to market about 1/2 of the venture’s output via its own network 
= 3 if the MNE was expected to market about 3/4 of the venture’s output via its own network 
0.30 0.79 
EQUITYRES 
(source of data: b,c) 
 
= 0 if the host country did not normally restrict foreign equity participation 
= 1 if the host country generally expected some local ownership but did not require local majority 
= 2 if the host country usually required local majority ownership 
= 3 if the host country discouraged foreign equity participation without prohibiting it entirely 
1.74 0.93 
PERSONNELRES 
(source of data: b,c) 
= 0 if the screening authorities of the host country generally did not restrict foreign investors from 
putting their own personnel in key managerial positions 
= 1 otherwise 
0.73 0.45 
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TABLE 1 
Specification of the Two Simultaneous Regression Equations 
 
  Equation 1: 
LHS Variable = SHARE 
  Equation 2: 
LHS Variable = CONTROL 
 
RHS Variables Expected Sign of 
Regression Coefficient 
Hypothesis 
Being Tested 
Expected Sign of 
Regression Coefficient 
Hypothesis 
Being Tested 
INTERCEPT ?  ?  
SHARE N/A  + H5 
CONTROL + H5 N/A  
TRAINING + H1 – H1 
SIMILARITY – H2 + H2 
PROTECTION 0a  + H3 
MARKETING + H4 + H4 
EQUITYRES –  0a  
PERSONNELRES –  –  
aThe variable is excluded from the regression equation because it is expected to have no direct 
effect on the left-hand-side variable when the effects of other variables are controlled for. 
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TABLE 2 
Estimated Coefficients from Regression Analysisa 
 
  Simultaneous-Equation Modelb   
 
RHS Variables 
Equation 1: 
LHS = SHARE 
Equation 2: 
LHS = CONTROL 
Binomial  
Logit Modelc 
INTERCEPT 0.14 
(0.24) 
1.98*** 
(0.37) 
0.49 
(1.38) 
SHARE  0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
CONTROL 0.06 
(0.05) 
  
TRAINING 0.13*** 
(0.03) 
–0.40*** 
(0.14) 
1.35*** 
(0.44) 
SIMILARITY –0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.51* 
(0.26) 
–1.83*** 
(0.48) 
PROTECTION  0.61*** 
(0.12) 
–0.39 
(0.50) 
MARKETING 0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
1.58* 
(0.73) 
EQUITYRES –0.10** 
(0.05) 
 –0.72* 
(0.41) 
PERSONNELRES 0.29** 
(0.11) 
–1.94*** 
(0.30) 
1.82* 
(1.07) 
aN = 93. Standard deviation in parentheses. The likelihood ratio test shows that each of the 
regression equations is significant at the 0.01 level.  
bThese two columns report the regression coefficients estimated under the simultaneous-equation 
model. The left-hand-side variable in equation 1 is SHARE and the left-hand-side variable in 
equation 2 is CONTROL. 
cThis column reports the regression coefficients estimated under a binomial logit model, where 
the value of the dependent variable was set to zero if the MNE had no ownership interest in the 
venture and set to one otherwise. 
    *p < 0.1 
  **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
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TABLE 3 
Ordered Probit and OLS Estimations of Equation 2 without Simultaneitya 
 
  Adopted Coding of 
CONTROLb 
 Alternative Coding of 
CONTROLb 
 
RHS Variables Ordered Probit OLS Ordered Probit OLS 
INTERCEPT –0.24 
(0.59) 
1.68*** 
(0.60) 
–0.30 
(0.57) 
1.41** 
(0.62) 
SHARE 0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
TRAINING –0.12 
(0.15) 
–0.17 
(0.15) 
–0.13 
(0.14) 
–0.17 
(0.16) 
SIMILARITY –0.01 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
–0.05 
(0.22) 
–0.02 
(0.21) 
PROTECTION 0.52*** 
(0.19) 
0.65*** 
(0.20) 
0.45* 
(0.23) 
0.63*** 
(0.21) 
MARKETING 0.13 
(0.18) 
0.28 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
0.11 
(0.22) 
PERSONNELRES –1.14*** 
(0.41) 
–1.62*** 
(0.40) 
–0.95** 
(0.40) 
–1.29*** 
(0.42) 
Log likelihood function –101.19*** –159.58*** –102.92*** –162.94*** 
aN = 93. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
bThe adopted coding of CONTROL is specified the Appendix. Under the alternative coding, a 
party is considered to have less control if it held all the key managerial positions but faced some 
contractual constraints on its decision making power than if it held only a majority of those key 
positions and possibly faced no contractual constraints. In other words, the ranking of categories 
1 and 2 and the ranking of categories 4 and 5, as defined in the Appendix, are reversed. 
    *p < 0.1 
  **p < 0.05 
***p < 0.01 
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